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A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network is currently implemented in Vienna by
integrating seven QKD-Link devices that connect five subsidiaries of SIEMENS Aus-
tria. We give an architectural overview of the network and present the enabling QKD-
technologies, as well as the novel QKD network protocols.
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1. Motivation
The rapid progress in theory1,2,3 and experiment4 of QKD techniques has been
reflected by a number of successful demonstrations in the last few years. Many
groups all over the world have put forward QKD setups operating in the standard
point-to-point modus, thus realizing what we denote as QKD-Links [Fig. 1(a)].
Initial attempts to assemble QKD based networks have also been launched.5
A number of research spin-offs (IdQuantique, MagiQ and SmartQuantum) offer
QKD technology but also some internationally operating companies (e.g. Toshiba,
Thales, HP and NEC) develop QKD setups aiming at a market realization in near
future. The secure communication solutions pursued are typically based on dedi-
cated high-end symmetric-encryption devices with frequent key change, whereby
fresh key is constantly generated by QKD devices. The resulting QKD-Link-
Encryptors (with encryption rates potentially up to 10 Gb per second) offer compa-
rable functionality to existing products but feature higher level of security. Broad
proliferation of QKD technology is hindered however by a number of road blocks
revolving typically around: the point-to-point paradigm and correspondingly the
quadratic scaling of the initial secrets with the number of users, the question of
integrability in existing networks, the high price of QKD devices, but also around
issues like missing standards. As a result, QKD appears to be forced into a narrow
niche market.
The EU funded FP6 project SECOQC – Development of a Global Network for
∗For affiliations of the SECOQC partners see http://www.secoqc.net/html/partners.html
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Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptographya aims to work against
these limitations. A standardization initiative and a dedicated effort on optimiza-
tion of single-photon-detection (a major technological challenge for QKD result-
ing in a heavy cost factor) are part of this project. The main goal, however, is
taking in operation and testing an integrated secrets’ distribution network, de-
signed as a Quantum Back Bone network (QBB) deployed for test purposes in the
city of Viennab. Thereby heterogenic QKD-systems by different SECOQC partners
are connected with node modules, which overtake the network functionalities. The
QBB, deployed on a typical telecommunication metropolitan area network (MAN)
is an important step towards demonstrating the feasibility of fully networked multi-
point to multi-point quantum key distribution. A target market of networked secure
communication solutions for organizations with distributed facilities such as gov-















Fig. 1. (Color online). Alice and Bob want to share a secret key. (a) Point-to point QKD-Link L:
A typical solution nowadays. (b) Quantum network: The QKD-Links LA and LB are used to access
the QBB, the nodes of the QBB being represented by squares (in blue) and the corresponding
QKD-Links being denoted by L1 through L6. All QKD-Links provide unconditionally secure
channels. An end-to-end secure channel from Alice to Bob along the paths LA-L5-LB, LA-L1-
L2-LB and LA-L3-L4-LB allows secure transmission of a secret key.
2. Advantages of Using QKD-Networks
The underlying idea is to build up a network for distributing secrets out of single
point-to-point QKD-Links. The corresponding QKD-Link end points (i.e. the QKD
devices) are situated in network nodes. These nodes are secure sites, in which one
or more QKD devices are located together with a central node module, dedicated
to processing, storage and communication. These node modules are the network
aSee http://www.secoqc.net. The work presented here originates from the combined efforts of 41
project partners working together in various subgroups.
bTo be demonstrated in September 2008.
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agents taking over (in the SECOQC approach) full control of classical communi-
cation channels, the management of the generated secret keys, their information-
theoretical secure transmission from node to node on a hop-by-hop manner,6 and
issues like finding paths to distant nodes and ensuring the synchrony of secret key
provision to key-consuming applications across the network.
A QKD-network, following this design, is then an infrastructure for distributing
the secret keys between nodes on a many-to-many basis over potentially unlimited
distances. Under the assumption that the nodes can be trusted, it allows to utilize
the information-theoretic security of quantum key distribution and achieve uncondi-
tional key distribution across the network. It should be underlined that while other
approaches to designing quantum key distribution have been put forward (see e.g.
Ref. 6 for a discussion) the trusted repeater architecture, adopted by SECOQC,7
is the only currently feasible one that allows both going beyond the point-to-point
and the limited distance constraints of standard QKD.
Figure 1(b) shows an universal building block: a rectangle with diagonals that is
formed by four QBB-nodes (squares) connected together by six links. Additionally,
each QBB node may act as a possible entry for end-users to be connected to the
QBB by a single QKD-Link. This quantum access network (QAN) is shown in
Fig. 1(b) for an example of two users, Alice and Bob (circles).
In what follows, we list the main advantages of QKD-networks over single QKD-
Links:
• To include an additional end-user into the network, only a single QKD-Link is
needed for connecting him to the closest node of the QBB. Then all other users
already attached at the QBB are potential partners and can share a key with
him.
• For a high number of end-users, the scaling of a QKD-network comprising a QBB
and QANs is strongly favorable. For single point-to-point connections the number
of needed QKD-Links increases as N(N−1)2 for N users. The presented network
grows only linearly with N , as this is the number of the needed QAN-Links.
• In a metropolitan area, setting a direct fiber link between Alice and Bob would
typically be far longer than the corresponding distances connecting both end-
users to the QBB. Due to this lower loss of the access links and the potentially
high supply of secure key through the QBB, the overall key rate will be higher
using a QKD-network.
• Within the QBB, links can be cascaded in series to connect users at longer dis-
tances and in parallel to obtain higher values of secure key rate. Fig. 1.b shows the
case of a key request of user Alice and Bob connected with corresponding links
LA and LB to the QBB. Here link L5 is connected in parallel to a link formed by
L1 and L2 and another one by L3 and L4. Assuming a fixed cost per QKD device,
one can look for an optimum in overall cost as function of the single-link distance
between two nodes. For a number of advanced QKD-systems, the corresponding
optimal distance turns out to be around 25 km for a one-dimensional chain of
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links as well as for a two-dimensional network.8 This is also the average distance
in the SECOQC Demonstrator.
• In the case of an intruder that causes one link to fail due to any attack (e.g. L5 in
the upper example), the requested key could still be delivered by other remaining
routes through the network.
• Furthermore, with the same argument, if one link is corrupted by the powerful
denial-of-service attack, the pre-shared initial secrets of the link under attack
will run out. In a single-link scenario, human interaction is needed to restore the
pre-shared secret. In contrast, in a quantum network, this key can be restored
over the remaining quantum links.
3. Network Demonstration in Vienna 2008
To introduce and demonstrate new network functionalities and to show the various
advantages over single links, we implement a universal rectangular building block
(Fig. 2) out of four stations in Vienna (SIE, ERD, GUD, BREIT) and extend it
by one node at a nearby city St. Po¨lten. All QBB-Links are implemented including






Fig. 2. (Color online). Concept of the deployed universal building block for quantum key distri-
bution networking. The names refer to the stations of the ring network.
In contrast to the architecture of the DARPA quantum network,5 in which the
quantum channel was actively controlled by a fiber-optical switch depending on the
communication partners, in the presented SECOQC quantum network each pair of
QKD-devices forming a QKD-Link remain together. The task of each QBB-Link is
to grow as much key as possible and to hand it over to the network node, no matter
which end-user will request for it afterwards.
All of the used QKD devices have reached high maturity before leaving the var-
ious labs and are being prepared for deployment and operation at field conditions.
The feasibility of the discussed network architecture will then be tested in real-life
conditions.
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3.1. Telecom fiber ring network from Siemens
All the links will be operated on a typical ring-shaped network to connect office-
buildings of SIEMENS Austria. Fig. 3 shows the fiber ring with a circumference
of approximately 63 km. We use four node-stations distributed well over the whole
city of Vienna and one in St. Poelten, another city connected by an 85 km long
fiber. The fibers for both cross-connections are also physically deployed in the ring
(connecting the two pairs of non-neighboring nodes respectively).
Fig. 3. (Color online). City map of Vienna including the fiber ring network and the stations SIE,
ERD, GUD and BREIT. Another station, St. Po¨lten, is located far outside of Vienna.
Each QKD-device pair is connected by their own dark fiber serving as an exclu-
sive quantum channel. The classical communication is managed by dedicated node
modules using one additional fiber-loop in the ring, which is realized by a set of
communication lasers multiplexed using CWDM spacing.
3.2. QKD-link-devices for the Quantum Back Bone QBB
For a convincing demonstration of the network features, SECOQC has decided to
develop high-rate stable QKD-Link devices. Only devices with a secure key rate of
more than 1 kbit/s after authentication over 25 km of fibers are accepted for the
stage of deployment. Clearly the link devices must fulfill tight security standards.3
Moreover, the devices must be autonomously delivering the key for more than 6
months without human interaction. The latency time for a new start (for example,
after change of the fiber connection) is limited to 1 minute.
For the stage of deployment the following systems have met these criteria and
form the QBB-network:
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• IdQuantique (Switzerland): The Swiss company delivers three devices-pairs usu-
ally referred to as “Plug & Play” system.9 By attenuating a strong pulse to single-
photon level within one round-trip, no additional compensation of the drifts from
the interferometers and fiber are needed.
• GAP Geneva/IdQuantique/ARC (Switzerland/Austria): The university group
headed by Prof. Gisin develops one QKD system in which the position of non-
empty time slots of the attenuated light pulses carries the transmitted bit value.10
Coherence between the photons reveals any intruder who would try extracting
information out of the system.
• Toshiba (UK): The group of Andrew Shield develops one QKD system with two
interferometers, which are stabilized by classical pulses sent after the quantum
signals (weak coherent pulses approximating single photons). BB84 in the phase
modulation version is implemented.11 To beat the photon number splitting attack
for weak coherent pulses, i.e increase the secure key rate at 25 km, decoy states
are implemented.
• University of Vienna/ARC/KTH (Austria/Sweden): Entangled photons have
been studied by Prof. Zeilinger for a long time and are now being also transferred
to telecommunication wavelength. Implemented this fundamental quantum-
mechanical property by the BBM92 protocol, the correlations of detections of
entangled photon-pairs at different QKD-devices are used to generate the key.12
• CNRS/Thales/ULB (France/Belgium): The consortium lead by Prof. Grangier
develops the only continuous variable QKD system in the prototype. Stronger
pulses with tens of photons in each pulse are used instead of weak coherent pulses.
Homodyne detection replaces in this case the usage of single photon detectors.13
3.3. QKD-link-devices for the Quantum Access Network (QAN)
In order to connect an end-user device to the QBB, a single link towards one QBB-
node must be established, whereby the shortest connection is aspired. For this
quantum access network any kind of QKD devices can be employed in principle.
The secure key rate to be generated for each user is expected to be far below the
typical connection load at the QBB. Therefore QAN-Links call for simple devices
with lower rates, but also of lower cost. As a special case, to extend QKD-networks
to areas with lower penetration of deployed fiber infrastructure, free space QKD is
an appropriate alternative. For this reason, two free-space QKD systems have been
included:
• Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich (Germany): The free-space system devel-
oped by the group Prof. Weinfurter has a typical working distance of 500 m.14
To reach typical MAN-like distances the possible distance can be extended to 3
km. Up to now, only night-time operation is possible, but the used single-photon
detectors based on Silicon permit higher key generation rates.
• University of Bristol (UK): The team under Prof. Rarity developed a portable
QKD-device.15 The operation distance is only a fraction of a meter, but the aim
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of this unique development is to enhance the security of existing applications
like the interaction with ATMs by creating hand-held consumer devices for PIN
protection and authentication.
3.4. Network nodes
All end-devices of the QBB-Links and at least one device of each QAN-Link are
situated within a network node (Alice 1, Alice 2 and Alice 3 in Fig. 4) communicate
with the node module. As mentioned before, each pair of QKD-devices form a
link and will remain together in this presented network architecture. We do not
implement switching on the level of QKD-Link devices, because one goal was to
allow connectivity to the network for a broad range of heterogeneous QKD-devices
only by adopting common interfaces and protocols to the network node-module.
Fig. 4. (Color online). The node module manages the secret keys and the classical communication
generated by all QKD devices. Device independent operation is ensured by a common interface.
The needed authentication of messages is also provided by the node module.
The task of each QBB-Link is to continuously grow as much key as possible
and to hand it over to the network nodes. Thereby a node module overtakes the
important task of storage and handling of the generated keys. On one hand, the
node module oversees the separate link-devices in the node, and even more impor-
tantly in the presented architecture, it provides them with classical communication
connectivity to the partner devices of the respective QKD-Link. The indispens-
able message authentication of the classical part of the QKD-Link communication
needed to overcome potential man-in-the-middle attacks is also provided by the
node module, the QKD-protocol stack of each link being responsible to decide
which communication messages are to be authenticated.
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On the other hand, the node module is further responsible for the overall network
functionality by executing the QKD higher-level network protocol stack (discussed
in more detail below), which in charge of routing and transporting the generated
secrets on the network level. The node-module functionality implies that all node-
modules are connected over public channels with each other (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. (Color online). Four nodes of the QBB are connected with quantum channels and com-
municate over the public channels. Between nodes A and B, one specific connection is highlighted
to emphasize the communication of the Q3P network protocol.
4. Network Protocols
As already mentioned, several different devices will compose the SECOQC QBB
network. As each of them has different characteristics and interfaces, a common
protocol has been designed to access services provided by the devices in an uniform
manner: the Quantum-Point-to-Point-Protocol or Q3P.16
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This protocol serves as Point-to-Point Protocol between a pair of QBB nodes
(see Fig. 5) which enables the devices underneath to carry out the classical com-
munication protocol for key distillation over an authenticated channel, while simul-
taneously providing authentication and encryption for upper layers in the network.
Both authentication and encryption are information-theoretically secure.
Using Q3P as an uniform building block interconnecting a pair of QKD devices
one can now employ traditional network protocols on top of it. However most
widespread protocols like TCP/IP are not directly compatible with the specific
requirements of quantum key distribution: network reliability in terms of TCP-like
re-sending packets has to be considered carefully since the content of the packets in
a QKD case is highly sensitive with respect to confidentiality and/or authenticity.
Therefore well known protocols have been adapted to form a new set of end-
to-end networking mechanisms.17 The QKD Routing Layer (QKD-RL) Protocol
addresses the routing information within the QBB nodes. This protocol follows
the pattern of OSPF but includes essential modifications to address the specific
requirements arising from the sensitivity and scarceness of key material.
Finally, the QKD Transport Layer (QKD-TL) Protocol adopts TCP/IP and
introduces new approaches to dealing with highly congested networks based on
quantum key resources. This protocol finally lets users exchange information across
the network with perfect confidentiality and authenticity on an end-to-end basis.
All three protocols sketched above are independently designed and each presents
a standard-like interface, which can easily be introduced in current telecom network
infrastructures. No applications running on upper layers need to be modified in
order to use the unconditionally secure key material.
5. Conclusions and Outlook
A quantum key distribution network covering a full inner-city metropolitan area
network using seven fiber-based QKD devices, realized by five different working
principles and two free-space QKD setups will be demonstrated in September
2008 in Vienna. This implementation in the framework of the EU-funded FP6-
project SECOQC clearly shows the feasibility of constructing highly integrated
QKD-networks. Heterogeneous modern QKD devices are combined through com-
mon interfaces and universal node modules into unified secret distribution infras-
tructure. This important step towards practical deployment offers end-users and
network providers a vision of future secure communication facilities.
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